A study of how body and mind are linked with territory.
Somalis are producing a unique type of globalization, which manifests itself under the regime of anarchy.
Somalia, [a country situated in the East-west strategic point of the Horn of Africa], from 1991 to present, is cited as a real world example of a stateless society and of the non-existence of legal system. From the fall of Siad Barre’s government in January 1991 until the capture of Mogadishu by the Islamic Courts Union in June 2006, there was no permanent national government in Somalia. Large areas of the country such as Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug, Maakhir, and Southwestern Somalia are internationally unrecognized autonomous regions. The remaining areas, including the capital Mogadishu, were divided into smaller territories ruled by competing warlords. Until now, taxes ceased to be collected, regulatory agencies ceased to regulate. Since that time, thirteen different peace conferences have attempted to create a new government for all of Somalia, but all of them have failed. How does, in our times, a stateless society continue to still exist? Could the survival of this advanced and complex system of distribution of power survive without the developing of strong relationships of global interdependence?
For some theoreticians, Somalia in its stateless period provided a unique test of the theory of anarchy. Following the downfall of the Siad Barre regime, there was effectively no formal monocentric government law in Somalia. While some urban areas such as Mogadishu had private police forces, many Somalis simply returned to the traditional clan-based legal structures for local governance, and they have been identified as “legendary individualists”, susceptible to anarchist forms of social organization.
Regarding the social existing conditions, the level of daily violence during all this period was catastrophic, since the impact of governmental collapse and the ensuing civil war led to the breakdown of political institutions, the destruction of social and economic infrastructure and the massive internal and external migrations. However, according to studies of 2005, Somalia ranked in the top 50 percent in six of our 13 measures, and ranked near the bottom in only three: infant mortality, immunization rates, and access to improved water sources. This compares favourably with circumstances in 1990, when Somalia last had a government and was ranked in the bottom 50 percent for all seven of the measures for which we had that year’s data: death rate, infant mortality, life expectancy, main telephone lines, tuberculosis, and immunization for measles and DTP.
This shows partially, that in the absence of functioning governmental institutions and regulations, voluntary, non-coercive alternatives emerged. Economical researchers identify areas where the private sector adapted to the stateless environment. The journalist Kevin Sites, after a trip to anarchic Somalia, reported that “Somalia, though brutally poor, is a kind of libertarian’s dream. Free enterprise flourishes, and vigorous commercial competition is the only form of regulation. Somalia has some of the best telecommunications in Africa, with a handful of companies ready to wire home or office and provide crystal-clear service, including international long distance, for about $10 a month.” According to the CIA World Factbook, private telephone companies offer service in most major cities via wireless technology, charging the lowest international rates on the continent, while The New York Times has noted the private provision of mail services. According to a 2005 World Bank report, the “private airline business in Somalia is now thriving with more than five carriers and
price wars between the companies.” In addition, the private sector grew impressively, according to the
World Bank in 2003, particularly in the areas of trade, commerce, transport, remittance and infrastructure
services and in the primary sectors, notably in livestock, agriculture and fisheries. The economist Peter T. Leeson, in an event study of “the impact of anarchy on Somali development”, found that “the data suggest
that while the state of this development remains low, on nearly all of 18 key indicators that allow pre- and
post-stateless welfare comparisons, Somalis are better off under anarchy than they were under government.”
Today, there exist 15-17 million Somali people, from whom only 9,1 million continue to live in Somalia. Most of the remaining live now in the state of constant movement, seeking refuge and are categorized from international organizations as internally displaced persons (IDPs). The rest of them are dispersed in the world, categorized in three major groups: a) immigrants, b) forced immigrants and c) refugees and asylum seekers. Somali refugees are amongst the largest refugee population in the world and the Somali diaspora is very widely scattered. How can we map a state of anarchy, or how can we map the people who do not live within the borders of their own country? Can we draw conclusions of how territory is linked with the people and their common identity?
In this case, territory, people and identity are linked in a very special way. Mapping the Somali diaspora – starting at the international level, continuing with the Horn of Africa and zooming into the Somali neighbourhoods of Addis Ababa, a city functioning as a “stepping stone” of their big exodus to Europe and America – shows that the idea of territory remains an obscure image for the Somalis. Studies of population movements, the economic flow and emerging political and cultural elements inside and outside the Somali “invisible” borders indicate that Somalia is everywhere. Somalis are producing a unique type of globalization, which manifests itself under the regime of anarchy and may constitute today of the most modern type of capitalism. War takes part in the erasure of national boundaries, questioning the classical notion of nationhood. The stateless society helps the development of multiple and complex interrelationships in a global base. However, we should also have in mind the unique culture of Somali people, who, belonging to a nomadic culture, live in the constant movement and change and produce a special way to organize their space and territory. They step into the land of the in-between: in search of an identity between then (before the civil war) and now using this dipole of body and mind, land and spirit. They know that they belong everywhere.
To be continued…
Somalia and the theory of anarchy. Marginal Revolution, Alex Tabarrok, http://www.marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2004/04/somalia_and_the.html
-In Somalia, Those Who Feed Off Anarchy Fuel It, Jeffrey Gettleman, The New York Times, 2007-04-27
-The Rule of Law Without the State, Spencer Heath Mac-Callum, Mises Daily Article, Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2007-09-12
-Violence continues unabated in Somalia. News & Special Reports, Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2005
-Somali Anarchy Is More Orderly than Somali Government, Benjamin Powell, The Independent Institute, 2006
-In the Hot Zone, Kevin Sites, Harper Perennial, New York, 2007
-World Bank Advisory Committee for Somalia Country Re-engagement Note, 2003
-Somalia After State Collapse: Chaos or Improvement?, Benjamin Powell, Ryan Ford, Alex Nowrasteh, Independent Institute, 2006
I would rather opt for a history of ideas and political history definition of anarchy. The notion that anarchy means weak central government, while warlords and free market reign is totally unacceptable, in that it squarely identifies anarchy with raw power struggle and market deregulation. Lack of central government doesn’t mean lack of power structures at a lower lever; lower-level power structures and networks aren’t what anarchy’s theorists have ever had in mind.
ReplyDeleteNo doubt that a weak central government may be better than a powerful and corrupt central government. No doubt that some indicators may improve (temporarily?) if harsh modes of regional governance are applied: harsh punishment (like those stipulated by sharia) may reduce crime, and guns may convince people to work harder.
The notion of “people living in their own country” and their supposed “common identity” are hardly applicable in our case: To take for granted that people belonging to dozens of tribes have a “common identity” just because they happen to live within the borders of some state, while they probably identify themselves on the basis of their tribe, is at least simplistic; and incompatible with the praise of stateless societies (although in our case “stateless” should be definitely understood in Hobbes’ negative notion, than in prince Kropotkin’s positive way).